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OPERATION BANNER - AN ANALYSIS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND has apparently been prepared, if the introduction by General Sir Mike Jackson is to be believed, so that lessons can be learned. If that is the case General Jackson and many others will be disappointed.
It is something of a coup for International rights body 'The Pat Finucane Centre' (pfc) that they have managed to secure a copy of the 98 page document. Those interested will find it at:
but be quick as rather intriguingly the pfc say "It is clear that the document was not intended to be put in the public domain. We are making it temporarily available on our website in case the MoD attempts to restrict access." The pfc also, accurately, states, "This deeply flawed document is powerful evidence of why we need to deal with the past honestly and openly. We have written to Defence Secretary Des Browne demanding that the MoD withdraw this document and that he write to specific families in Derry and South Armagh to apologise for comments contained in the text."
There is no doubt that some of the comment in the document will be grossly offensive to many in the nationalist community who have suffered over the past thirty five years.
However, even in its analysis the almost 'peter and jane' type approach to recounting events and the flawed conclusions drawn is jarring.
In relation to internment the following
"Internment "Operation DEMETRIUS, the introduction of Internment, was in practice an operational level reverse. A considerable number of terrorist suspects were interned: the net total of active IRA terrorists still at large decreased by about 400 between July and December 1971. A very large amount of intelligence had been gained: the number of terrorists arrested doubled in six months. However, the information operations opportunity handed to the republican movement was enormous.
Both the reintroduction of internment and the use of deep interrogation techniques had a major impact on popular opinion across Ireland, in Europe and the US. Put simply, on balance and with the benefit of hindsight, it was a major mistake."
It was a mistake that was not learned from - the brutality and ill treatment used against those interned is used sometimes with fatal effect in Iraq today.
The 'cloud cuckoo land' inhabited by the author(s) is also illustrated in comments on operation Motorman:
"The Operation was formally closed down on 1 December 1972. Tactically it had been a reasonable success. It had re-imposed the ability of the security forces to operate throughout Northern Ireland. It had demonstrated that the rule of law would be applied in all places. It had reassured moderates of all persuasions, and PIRA had lost significant face. A large number of terrorists had been detained and interned, but few of the PIRA higher command had been caught. Operationally, however, MOTORMAN was a great success. It was a major defeat for PIRA as an insurgent body. It showed the World that the British Army could operate swiftly, efficiently and even-handedly. It clearly demonstrated Whitehall's determination not to be beaten. Unusually, the British Government's information operation to support MOTORMAN was well-handled and a success."
There is little doubt today that one of the main accelerants of violence in the North of Ireland was the aftermath of 'MOTORMAN' an operation which illustrated clearly in the brutality of its execution which 'side' the British Army was on!
Do not look in this report for evidence or honesty about military excesses. No detailed mention of will be found in the report of the Army's abuse of detainees and interestingly (this being a pdf file) a search for 'Gough barracks' brings up nothing.
In relation to the Security forces - out of control para-military militia - the UDR the author(s) excels himself:
"The B Specials were stood down in April 1970 and allowed to apply to join a new force, the UDR, which was to be a part of the Army. Enlistment was not automatic, as the Army took time to vet all applicants and exclude those with extremist views or connections. Like the RUC, the UDR never attracted as many catholics as it should have".
No mention of the links to murders or the cross border bombing campaigns by people who doubled up in loyalist death squads and UDR patrols. No mention of the weapons or intelligence passed over by the UDR - sometimes under the direction of British intelligence - to the murder gangs
The further statement that "Nonetheless, security breaches by members of the UDR and HSF were rare." flies in the face of the facts. These irrational assessments on the value of the UDR are further illustrated with what is perhaps one of the most bizarre sections in the report which says:
"The UDR and HSF chains of command were generally able to assess the reliability of individual members of the Regiments, and acted accordingly. The UDR and HSF performed a critical role, releasing units of the Regular Army for service in harder areas. They also did a major service by reassuring the protestant population. That was not just a matter of law and order: it was probably also a factor in ensuring that extremeloyalist violence was relatively rare because the protestant community largely did not feel itself to be at risk. In other words, the UDR served a significant operational as well as a tactical role."
That this attitude was 'the logic of the lunatic asylum' was borne out by the eventual decision to disband the UDR (something the Celtic League campaigned for vigorously) because it was so riven with sectarianism.
Just occasionally there is a tantalising glimpse of reality as seen when the report comments on the army role in support of the RUC saying:
"However, in the most difficult areas, such as West Belfast and South Armagh, the RUC could not operate without very considerable support. In practice the Army led operations in those areas until the early 1990s,"
In a section on the border, and the problem it caused over the period, once again the reports author(s) steer clear of the obvious conclusion that successive and sometimes repetitive policies failed seemingly because this basic truth appears to be to unpalatable even to the military today.
The section covering airborne (particularly helicopter) support operations was of especial interest to the Celtic League as we had over the period 1985-95 focused a lot of attention of publicising the difficulties the occupation force faced. Its clear from the report that air supply was critical and the whole operation would have collapsed without it. However again the author(s) is evasive and none of the difficulties that we highlighted such as the operational integrity of helicopter maintenance and the shortage of certain types (such as medium and heavy lift) is mentioned although this has now been well publicised elsewhere. In paras 611-613 the author appears once again to leantowards a more honest account but perhaps today's political and military constraints mitigate against it.
(See: (voir le site)
The report is lengthy. However the omissions within it are glaring and the lack of honesty about the shortcomings of the military during the whole story period not surprising but nonetheless disappointing.
Having read it (twice) one is left with the impression that an honest and accurately researched account of the British Army in N. Ireland is still to be written.
Perhaps the reason the British Army is making some of the same mistakes and perpetrating the same abuses in Iraq and Afghanistan that it made in N. Ireland is because tawdry documents such as this become a rule of thumb at the British Army staff college.
As a credible record of OPERATION BANNER this document is shoddy and dishonest. The Celtic League hope that Defence Minister Des Browne will consider carefully the request from the Pat Finucane Centre that he withdraw it.
J B Moffatt Director of Information Celtic League
08/07/07
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